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The respondent, State of Utah, hereby waives the right 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, l 
Plaintiff-Appellee, J 
v. s 
MICHAEL DUANE SEEL AND i 
GLENN A. LEMON, 
t Case No. 910549-CA 
t Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant• 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from convictions of four counts of 
aggravated burglary, all first degree felonies, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1990); and four counts of theft, three 
of which are class B misdemeanors and one of which is a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1990). 
Defendant Seel was also convicted of possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-503 (Supp. 1991). This Court 
has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1991), as the matter was transferred from 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was the charge of habitual criminal read to the 
jury at the outset of trial? On remand, the trial court 
corrected the record to reflect that this charge was not read; 
-1-
the error was obvious, and second, whether the error was harmful. 
State v. Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989) • 
5. Did the trial court correctly construe the 
aggravated burglary statute in instructing that defendants 
possessed a weapon when the weapon was found in a briefcase in 
the vehicle in which defendants were traveling? Questions of 
statutory construction are questions of law which are reviewed 
for correctness. State v. Peterson, 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 
1991). Secondly, with regard to defendant Lemon, did the trial 
court correctly determine that Lemon could be found to be in 
possession of the weapon for purposes of aggravated burglary 
under an accomplice theory? A court's legal conclusions are 
reviewed under a correction of error standard. State v. Johnson, 
771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 
805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991). 
6. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it 
allowed the State to reopen its case and produce evidence that 
Seel knew of the presence of the weapon after the court had 
dismissed the possession of a weapon charge against both 
defendants? The decision to allow a party to reopen its case and 
present more evidence is within the discretion of the trial court 
and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Greaorious, 81 Utah 33, 16 P.2d 893, 895 (1932). A conclusion 
which is clearly against logic and the facts is an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Draper, 83 Utah 115, 27 P.2d 39, 49-50 
(1933). The issue of whether defendant Seel's right against 
-3-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 29, 1989, in an amended information, defendants 
were charged with four counts of aggravated burglary, all first 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann* S 76-6-203 
(1990); possession of a dangerous weapon by an unauthorized 
person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-1-503 (Supp. 1991); possession of an instrument for burglary 
or theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-205 (1990); four counts of theft, one class B misdemeanor, 
two third degree felonies, and one second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1990); and being an 
habitual criminal, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (Supp. 1991) (Record [hereafter R.] at 2-
5). 
Defendants were initially represented by retained 
counsel, Mark H. Tanner (R. at 17); however, on August 21, 1989, 
Mr. Tanner moved to withdraw (R. at 22). At a hearing conducted 
on September 6, 1989, the public defender, Allen S. Thorpe, was 
appointed to represent defendants (R. at 35). Both Mr. Tanner 
and Mr. Thorpe assured the court that no continuance of the 
trial, which was scheduled for September 25, 1989, would be 
needed (Transcript of motion to withdraw hearing). At that 
hearing, defendant Seel asked the court to appoint "legal aid" 
from Salt Lake County to represent defendants; the court declined 
to do so, and Seel acquiesced (Transcript of motion to withdraw 
hearing)• 
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At the conclusion of the trial/ the jury convicted both 
defendants of four counts of aggravated burglary and four counts 
of differing degrees of theft. They also convicted defendant 
Seel of possession of a dangerous weapon by an unauthorized 
person (R. at 98-114). Defendants were sentenced to the Utah 
State Prison and filed a notice of appeal (R. 140-41 and 152). 
Defendants' appeal was dismissed for failure to file a 
docketing statement, then reinstated (R. at 408 and 424). 
Counsel Keith H. Chiara was appointed to represent defendants on 
appeal (R. at 427). When it became apparent that the case had 
been mistakenly filed originally with this Court, the matter was 
transferred to the supreme court (R. at 490-91). 
The supreme court remanded the matter to the trial 
court to correct the record regarding which charges were read to 
the jury, and to correct the judgment and commitment (R. at 500-
502). Those corrections were made and the record was returned to 
the supreme court (R. at 517 and 525-29). After a supplemental 
record was filed, and after other procedural activities, the 
supreme court transferred the matter to this Court on September 
20, 1991. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At 4:08 a.m. on June 2, 1989, a sensory alarm was 
activated at the Ferron Drug Store in Ferron, Utah (R. at 211, 
222 and 249). Deputy Robert Blackburn of the Emery County 
Sheriff's Department, who lived less than a mile from the drug 
store, responded at 4:13 a.m. (R. at 211-12). Seconds later, as 
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the doors of the four Ferron businesses at about midnight and had 
found them all secured (R. at 220). He left Ferron after 
checking the doors and headed north on State Road 10 (State 
Street through Ferron). Between midnight and 4:00 a.m., he drove 
the twenty miles north to Huntington (R. at 220). During that 
time, he never saw the orange Scout on State Road 10, the main 
route north and south out of Ferron. He was southbound again, 
just north of Castle Dale, when he heard the alarm from Ferron 
Drug over his radio (R. at 221-22). He responded to the alarm at 
a high rate of speed; there was no northbound traffic on SR-10 
(R. at 222). The Scout was remarkable enough that Deputy Hansen 
would have remembered it if he had seen it on SR-10 between 
midnight and 4:00 a.m. (R. at 223-24). 
The officers called another deputy, J.D. Mangum, and 
asked him to stop the orange Scout (R. at 223). Deputy Mangum 
stopped the vehicle about eight miles north of Emery, Utah, at 
4:27 a.m.; defendant Seel was driving (R. at 225-26). As the 
deputy approached the Scout, he looked in to see if there were 
any visible weapons. He saw several items that appeared to be 
new because they were still in plastic wrappers with price 
stickers on them (R. at 227). Many of the items observed by-
Deputy Mangum were later identified by the owners as items taken 
from the four businesses in Ferron (R. at 282-86, 293-300, 305-
306 and 311). As the deputy spoke with Seel, the passenger, 
Lemon, kept his head down and avoided eye contact with the deputy 
(R. at 227). 
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Defendants did not object to the substitution of 
counsel three weeks before trial and cannot now complain that the 
court allowed substitution. The court did not abuse its 
discretion when it denied a belated motion to continue the trial. 
The motion was made only three days before trial and was not 
based on good cause. Even if it were error for the court to deny 
the motion to continue, defendants have not been prejudiced by 
the denial. 
Defendants have not demonstrated that they were denied 
the effective assistance of counsel. There was no error or 
prejudice in (either retained or appointed) counsels' failure to 
file a motion to suppress evidence because the motion would not 
have been granted. Any failure to file a motion to sever the 
dangerous weapon charge from the other counts was not 
prejudicial. Defendants have not demonstrated that there would 
have been a different trial result had severance occurred. The 
only thing in the record which supports defendants' claim that 
their counsel did not investigate alibi witnesses until just 
before trial is an affidavit by trial counsel. Even if counsels' 
performance were deficient in that area, defendants have not 
shown that there would have been a different trial result had the 
witnesses been found earlier. The habitual criminal charge was 
not read to the jury so no deficient performance occurred in this 
area. Defendants have not demonstrated that they were prejudiced 
by the way in which exclusion of witnesses occurred. Finally, 
the prosecutor's statements complained of by defendants were not 
-11-
Defendants did not object to the prosecutor's closing 
argument; consequently, this issue is not preserved for appellate 
review. Defendants have raised this issue in the context of the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. As noted in Point III, 
the comments were not error, and thus, not grounds for reversal. 
The admission of the burglary tools into evidence was 
not error. The tools were consistent with some of the tools 
stolen and were consistent with marks left when the businesses, 
and items within the businesses, were pried open. There was no 
testimony that the tools were "adapted, designed, or commonly 
used in" commission of a burglary; on that basis, the court 
dismissed the possession of burglary tools charge. However, the 
tools were still relevant as either items stolen in the 
burglaries or as items used to gain entrance to the businesses 
and the money tills. As relevant evidence, they were admissible. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS HAVE ABANDONED THE CLAIM THAT THE 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL CHARGE WAS READ TO THE JURY 
AT THE BEGINNING OF TRIAL. 
When defendant Seel's brief was filed in September of 
1990, the first issue was that the trial court had allowed the 
court clerk to read the habitual criminal charge, with 
accompanying recitation of defendants' criminal history, as part 
of the information. At the request of the State, the matter was 
remanded to the trial court to correct this part of the record 
(R. at 500-503). The court conducted a hearing and ordered that 
-13-
counsel (Tanner) filed a motion to withdraw on August 17, 1989; 
the matter was heard on September 6, 1989 (R. at 23 and 35). At 
that hearing, both Tanner and Allen Thorpe, the public defender, 
assured the court that the substitution could be done without a 
need for a continuance (Transcript of motion to withdraw hearing 
at p. 3). Neither of the defendants voiced any objection to the 
substitution; the only request was from Seel, asking that the 
Salt Lake County "legal aidM be appointed. When the court 
informed Seel that appointing counsel from Salt Lake City was not 
possible, Seel responded, "Okay" (Transcript at p. 4). Since no 
objection to the substitution of counsel was raised, this Court 
should decline to address that issue. 
Defendants' real argument appears to be that the court 
abused its discretion when it denied counsel's motion to continue 
which was filed three days before trial. 
It is well established in Utah, as 
elsewhere, that the granting of a continuance 
is at the discretion of the trial judge, 
whose decision will not be reversed by this 
Court absent a clear abuse of that 
discretion. State v. Moosman, Utah, 542 P.2d 
1093 (1975). Abuse may be found where a 
party has made timely objections, given 
necessary notice and made a reasonable effort 
to have the trial date reset for good cause. 
Griffiths v. Hammon. Utah, 560 P.2d 1375 
(1977). 
State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982). The record 
does not contain the court's decision on the motion; however, 
trial did commence as originally scheduled (R. at 41). This 
Court may infer that either the trial court denied the motion or 
counsel withdrew it. 
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handwritten notice of alibi on the day of trial listing two 
witnesses from Colorado whose anticipated testimony 
would be that they [the witnesses] were in 
the presence of both defendants in Price, 
Utah on the morning of June 2, 1989 at the 
hour of 3:00 a.m., thus rendering it 
impossible for the defendants to have been in 
Ferron[,] Utah at 3:16 a.m. 
(R. at 40). Defendant Seel testified at trial that he and Lemon 
had traveled to Price with friends, then, at approximately 3:00 
a.m., had decided to drive back south and get on 1-70 to go east 
to Denver (R. at 334-36). When they got to Huntington, they 
stopped at the 7-11 convenience store and bought gasoline (R. at 
336). On rebuttal, the clerk from the 7-11 testified that no 
orange Scout stopped for gasoline at approximately 3:00 a.m. on 
June 2; in fact, no gasoline was sold at that station between 
2:00 and 5:00 a.m. on that day (R. at 361). Even if defendants 
had had the two witnesses testify that they had been in Price at 
3:00 a.m., the jury would have been just as free to disbelieve 
their testimony as they were to disbelieve Seel's. In the face 
to the 7-11 clerk's testimony that no gasoline was sold and the 
officer's testimony that no vehicles traveled south on SR-10 as 
defendants claimed, defendants' story that they drove to Price 
and then drove southwest to go to a city east of their position2 
was not credible. Since Seel's story was at least partially 
fabricated, it is questionable whether the alibi witnesses would 
2
 The road which Seel testified they traveled on to Price 
would have taken them in a southeasterly direction, more in keeping 
with their desire to go east to Denver. 
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sufficiently prejudicial, defendant must 
affirmatively show that a "reasonable 
probability" exists that, but for counsel's 
error, the result would have been different. 
We have defined "reasonable probability" as 
that sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the reliability of the verdict. 
Id. at 405 (Utah 1986) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984)) (other citations and footnote 
omitted). This Court "'need not determine whether counsel's 
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered 
by defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. . . . If 
it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground 
of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be 
so, that course should be followed.'" Ld. (quoting Strickland, 
446 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069-70). The burden is on 
defendants to demonstrate prejudice. In State v. Montes, 804 
P.2d 543 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), this Court declined to reach 
defendant's claim because: 
Montes offers no analysis or explanation as 
to how this allegedly deficient omission by 
trial counsel might have affected the outcome 
of his trial or prejudiced his defense. If 
Montes has not satisfied his burden of 
showing that he was prejudiced as a result of 
the alleged deficiencies, this court need not 
reach the question of whether counsel's 
performance was defective. 
Id. at 546 (footnote omitted). Applying this test to the present 
case, defendants have not demonstrated that their counsel's 
performance was deficient or that they were prejudiced by 
counsel's performance. 
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stopping the vehicle is reasonable suspicion, not probable cause* 
Id. Defendants cite to Whitelev v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 
S.Ct. 1031 (1971), in support of their claim that evidence would 
have been suppressed had a motion been filed. That case is 
inapposite because it dealt with an arrest warrant which was 
based on an affidavit which was insufficient to establish 
probable cause; no arrest warrant is involved in the present 
case. A subsequent case, United States v. Henslev, 469 U.S. 221, 
105 S.Ct. 675 (1985), is more analogous to this matter. In that 
case, the Supreme Court held that a second law enforcement 
department may stop and investigate a vehicle based on another 
department's articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion 
that the wanted person has committed an offense. .Id. at 232, 105 
S.Ct. at 682. Deputy Blackburn had articulable facts which 
supported a reasonable suspicion that defendants had committed 
several burglaries. Deputy Blackburn had seen their vehicle in 
the vicinity of the burglaries, had observed their "faster than 
normal" speed leaving the burglaries and a swerving motion their 
vehicle made as the deputy braked to get a description of it (R. 
at 213-14). He had traveled on to the site of the burglaries and 
had seen that at least two businesses had been broken in to (R. 
at 215). These facts were relayed to the deputy who actually 
stopped defendants' vehicle and supported a finding of reasonable 
suspicion to stop the Scout (R. at 226). Defendants have not 
shown that their counsels' performance in failing to file a 
-21-
B. Failure to file a motion to sever. 
This Court addressed an assistance of counsel claim in 
the context of failing to file a motion to sever in State v. 
Hallett, 796 P.2d 701 (Utah App. 1990), Citing a Washington 
case, this Court said: 
"In order to prevail on an ineffective 
assistance claim based on counsel's failure 
to seek severance, the defendant must 
demonstrate both that the motion should have 
been granted and 'a reasonable probability' 
that, but for counsel's deficient 
performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different." 
Id. at 706 (quoting State v. Warren, 55 Wash.App. 645, 779 F.2d 
1159, 1164-65 (1989)). In Hallett, this Court stated that a 
motion to sever a witness tampering count from sexual abuse 
counts probably would have been granted. However, Hallett had 
"failed to demonstrate how severing the different charges would 
likely have produced a more favorable outcome." Id* In the 
present case, defendants have not demonstrated that severance 
would have resulted in a more favorable result. They simply 
state that, "The evidence necessary to prove Count V [possession 
of a firearm by a restricted person] obviously would have a 
prejudicial effect on the jury's attitude concerning the 
Defendants' ] guilt or innocence on the other counts within the 
Information." (Brief of Appellant Seel at pp. 30-31; Brief of 
Appellant Lemon at pp. 29-30). As in Hallett. defendants have 
"failed to offer any persuasive explanation of how severance 
would have produced a different outcome. Thus, any failure on 
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their attorneys of alibi witnesses until that late date for their 
own purposes. Either way, the record is not sufficient for this 
Court to determine whether either counsel was ineffective in 
their pretrial investigation and preparation. This Court should 
decline to address this issue and allow defendants to pursue any 
appropriate postconviction relief where an adequate record could 
be made. 
Even if the alibi witnesses had been contacted and had 
testified as defendants claim they would, the result of 
defendants' trial would not have been different. Had the 
witnesses testified that defendants were with them in Price, Utah 
at 3:00 a.m., that still would not have explained the testimony 
of the 7-11 clerk that defendants did not purchase gas in 
Huntington at the time that they claim they did, and the 
officer's testimony that there were no vehicles southbound on SR-
10 during that time frame (R. at 361 and 220-22). Neither would 
that testimony have explained the recently stolen property found 
in defendants' vehicle (R. at 227-29). One of the defendants 
still would have had to testify to present the story that they 
found the property at the side of the road. The alibi witnesses 
would not have changed the outcome of defendants' trial. 
D. Reading of the habitual criminal charge. 
Defendant Seel's brief alleges ineffective assistance 
of counsel because there was no objection to the reading of the 
habitual criminal charge. Since this matter was corrected by the 
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instant case merely alleges prejudice without 
pointing to inconsistencies in the record or 
other evidence which would show wherein he 
has been prejudiced. 
Id. (footnote omitted). Again, in a case involving violation of 
a witness exclusion order, the court said in State v. McGrath, 
749 P.2d 631 (Utah 1988): 
There was no evidence or suggestion that any 
witness changed his testimony because of the 
conversations. 
Id. at 634. The same requirement to show prejudice to 
demonstrate abuse of discretion when a trial court refuses to 
declare a mistrial exists in the realm of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
In the present case, defendants have not shown that the 
witnesses changed their testimony because of any conversations 
they may have conducted before being excluded from the courtroom. 
They merely allege that the witnesses could have modified their 
testimony. This is insufficient to establish prejudice in 
counsel's failure to invoke the witness exclusion rule earlier in 
the trial.3 
F. Failure to object to prosecutor's statements. 
The Utah Supreme Court has said: 
Counsel for both sides have "considerably 
more freedom in closing argumentH and "a 
right to discuss fully from their standpoints 
the evidence and the inferences and 
deductions arising therefrom.11 
3
 The supreme court expressly declined to adopt a position 
that prejudice was inherent in violation of a witness exclusion 
order in McGrath. 749 P.2d at 634. 
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availability, had either defendant been inclined to use it, made 
the comment a reasonable inference. 
The prosecutor's statements that the tools found in the 
Scout were burglary tools and consistent with the damage caused 
in entering the burglarized premises were also based on the 
evidence produced at trial and on reasonable inferences (R. at 
378-79). Witnesses did not testify that the tools found in the 
Scout were "adapted, designed, or commonly used" in burglary, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-205 (1990), and the court dismissed the 
charge of possession of burglary tools on that basis (R. at 345). 
However, there was testimony that the tools were consistent with 
the pry marks on the doors and the damage to tills and a doorknob 
(R. at 244-46 and 261-67). The prosecutor's comments were based 
on the evidence and inferences that the tools found in the Scout 
were used to open the doors of the businesses to facilitate the 
burglaries; the comments were not improper. 
The testimony regarding the glare of the headlights 
supports the prosecutor's comments regarding the position of the 
lights when Blackburn first saw them (R. at 381 and 394). 
Blackburn's testimony was that when he first saw the headlights 
they were just a "glare" which was stationary in the vicinity of 
the drugstore (R. at 212-13). Then, as Blackburn headed north 
toward the drugstore, the headlights started coming toward him 
(R. at 213 and 217-18). The prosecutor's argument was a proper 
comment on the evidence. 
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Defendants acknowledge that their counsel did not move 
to sever the count and have argued ineffective assistance of 
counsel on that basis in the previous point. Rule 9(d), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure (1991), provides that a defendant's 
right to severance of offenses is waived if the motion for 
severance is not made at least five days before trial. In State 
v. Lairbv. 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984), overruled in part on other 
grounds. State v, Ossana. 739 P.2d 628 (Utah 1987), the supreme 
court held that Lairby had waived severance because he had not 
moved for it. Id. at 1198. Even when a motion to sever was made 
but was untimely, waiver has been upheld. State v. Studham, 655 
P.2d 669 (Utah 1982). Subsequently, in State v. Saunders, 699 
P.2d 738 (Utah 1985), the court held that a denial of a timely 
motion to sever a possession of a firearm charge was reversible 
error. The court distinguished Studham because in Studham the 
motion to sever was denied for untimeliness, not on the merits. 
699 P.2d at 742. These cases stand for the proposition that a 
failure to file a motion to sever, or filing an untimely motion, 
waives appellate review of a severance issue. 
Because defendants waived their right to severance of 
the weapons possession charge, they have claimed on appeal that 
the court committed plain error by failing to sever the count sua 
sponte. In State v. Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989), this 
Court established the test for determining whether a case should 
be reversed on the basis of plain error. 
The first requirement for a finding of plain 
error is that the error be "plain,M i.e.# 
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stores. They had tools consistent with the pry marks at the 
crime scene in their vehicle. Their story about the route that 
they supposedly had traveled that night was shown to be false and 
their story about finding the stolen property was inherently 
incredible. This was not a weak case which needed evidence of 
their prior convictions that came in because of the weapons 
charge to tip the balance toward conviction. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONSTRUED THE WORD 
"POSSESSION" IN THE FIREARM CHARGE. 
Defendants argue that the trial court misconstrued the 
word "possession" for purposes of the possession of a dangerous 
weapon charge. Their argument is that "constructive possession" 
does not rise to the level of "equal gravity with" the other 
terms used to denote aggravation for purposes of the more serious 
crime of aggravated burglary (Brief of Appellant Seel at 38; 
Brief of Appellant Lemon at 37). However, this argument was 
never articulated to the trial court. At the close of the 
State's case, defendants moved for dismissal of the aggravated 
burglaries or, in the alternative, for reduction to third degree 
felonies. Defendants argued on the basis that the evidence did 
not "establish!] possession within the intent of the statute" (R. 
at 315). No specific claim was made that the court's definition 
of "possession" was erroneous; consequently, this Court should 
decline to review this claim. See State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 
1141, 1144 (Utah 1989). 
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1038 (Utah 1989); Roosevelt Citv v. Nebeker, 815 P.2d 738 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
Possession has been defined as 
[h]aving control over a thing with the intent 
to have and to exercise such control. 
The law, in general, recognizes two kinds 
of possession: actual possession and 
constructive possession. A person who 
knowingly has direct physical control over a 
thing, at a given time, is then in actual 
possession of it. A person who, although not 
in actual possession, knowingly has both the 
power and the intention at a given time to 
exercise dominion or control over a thing, 
either directly or through another person or 
persons, is then in constructive possession 
of it. 
Black's Law Dictionary 1163 (6th ed. 1990). Utah Code Ann. § 76-
1-601(9) (1990) defines "possess" as "to have physical possession 
of or to exercise dominion or control over tangible property." 
Instruction No. 17 defined "possession" as "1) actual physical 
possession which is knowing and intentional, or 2) constructive 
possession. A person has constructive possession of a deadly 
weapon when that weapon is knowingly subject to his dominion and 
control." (R. at 77)/ The evidence showed that defendant Seel 
knew that the firearm was in the attache case in the vehicle; 
consequently, he was in a position to exercise dominion or 
control over the gun. Since Seel was in constructive possession 
of the firearm while fleeing from a burglary, the court properly 
4
 Defendants did not object to the jury instructions. 
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participant" in the crime who was knowingly in possession of a 
dangerous weapon; consequently, Lemon also was properly charged 
with aggravated burglary. 
POINT VI 
DEFENDANT SEEL'S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT 
AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY WAS NOT VIOLATED BY 
THE COURT'S GRANTING A MOTION TO REOPEN THE 
EVIDENCE. 
At the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief, the 
court dismissed the possession of a dangerous weapon charge as to 
both defendants because there had been no evidence that either 
defendant had knowledge of the gun's presence (R. at 323). After 
further discussion, the court allowed the State to reopen its 
case and present evidence about Seel's knowledge about the gun 
(R. at 326-27). In light of the additional evidence, the court 
again dismissed that charge against Lemon but not as against Seel 
(R. at 345). 
"It [is] within the discretion of the court to permit 
[a] case to be reopened." State v. Greaorious, 81 Utah 33, 16 
P.2d 893, 895 (1932). See also College Irrigation Co. v. Logan 
River & Blacksmith Fork Irrigation Co., 780 P.2d 1241, 1245 (Utah 
1989). "The general rule concerning abuse of discretion is that 
the appellate court 'will presume that the discretion of the 
trial court was properly exercised unless the record clearly 
shows the contrary.'" State v. Jona3, 793 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 
App. 1990) (quoting Goddard v. Hickman. 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 
(Utah 1984)). 
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statement regarding his concern as to the adequacy of the 
evidence concerning the manslaughter charge was not an actual 
acquittal on that charge. Accordingly, defendant's 
constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy 
clause were not offended by his conviction of negligent 
homicide." Id. at 147. The Washington case relied on by the 
court is similar factually to the present case. In gtate v. 
McClelland, 604 P.2d 969 (Wash.App. 1979), the trial court had 
dismissed the charge based on doubts about the sufficiency of the 
evidence. 3jd. at 970. But, as the Washington appellate court 
noted: 
[i]t is apparent that no one took these 
remarks as a final determination of the case, 
because there was no adjournment and the 
discussion between court and counsel 
continued. Nothing in the record indicates 
that the defendant, who was present, left. 
The court was still in the decision-making 
process. 
Id. at 971. Quoting an earlier case, the Washington court said: 
"Either a journal entry or more likely and 
preferably a formal order would have been 
necessary to terminate the matter." 
Id. (quoting State v. Aleshire, 89 Wash.2d 67, 568 P.2d 799, 801 
(1977)). See also United States v. Baker, 419 F.2d 83, 89 (2d 
Cir. 1969). 
Just as in McClelland, the trial court in the present 
matter was still in the decision-making process when the court 
acquitted on the weapon charge. No journal entry or formal order 
had been entered, the court and counsel continued to discuss the 
case, defendant was still present, there was no adjournment. 
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The claim also fails factually. The charge that the 
tools were burglary tools was dismissed because there was no 
testimony that they were "adapted, designed, or commonly used in 
advancing or facilitating the commission11 of a burglary. Utah 
Code Ann. $ 76-6-205 (1990). The tools were still relevant and 
admissible because there was testimony that the tools were 
consistent with the marks left in entering the burglarized 
businesses (R. at 246, 261-62 and 265-66). Some of the tools 
were similar to items missing from some of the businesses (R. at 
237 and 282-86). The tools were found in defendants' vehicle (R. 
at 265-67). The tools were admissible as evidence relevant to 
the issue of whether the possessors of the tools, defendants, 
committed the substantive crimes. Rules 401 and 402, Utah Rules 
of Evidence (1991). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendants' convictions and sentences. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this y\ - day of October, 
1991. 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
Defendants Michael Duane Seel (Seel) and Glenn A. Lemon 
(Lemon) appeal from convictions of four counts of aggravated 
burglary and four counts of theft. Seel also appeals from a 
conviction of possession of a firearm by a restricted person. We 
affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
Defendants were stopped at 4:27 a.m. on June 2, 1989, with 
stolen merchandise in their orange and white Scout International. 
Seel was driving and Lemon sat in the front passenger seat. In 
the back of the vehicle was new merchandise, still wrapped in the 
original plastic, with the price stickers attached, from four 
Ferron, Utah businesses that had been burglarized earlier that 
morning. Within both defendants' easy reach, in the center of 
the back seat, not covered by the merchandise, was an attache 
case containing a loaded .357 Magnum pistol and boxes of 
ammunition. 
had not produced evidence that either of the defendants knew the 
pistol was in the Scout. The State moved to reopen its case and 
present evidence of possession of the firearm* The court granted 
the motion and admitted testimony that Seel knew the gun was in 
the Scout. Seel then testified in his own behalf that defendants 
had been in Price with friends at the time of the burglaries, had 
purchased gas at a certain Huntington Seven-Eleven, and had found 
the new merchandise in an area the size of a table, at the right 
side of the road between Castle Dale and Ferron. The Seven-
Eleven clerk testified that defendants did not purchase gas in 
Huntington at the time they claimed. An officer who had 
patrolled the area during that time testified that no southbound 
vehicles were on that road at that time, and that he would have 
noticed the orange and white Scout. After hearing the additional 
evidence, the court dismissed the possession of a firearm charge 
as to Lemon, but reinstated the charge as to Seel, based on the 
testimony that Seel knew the pistol was in the Scout. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted both 
defendants of four counts of aggravated burglary, all first 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1990) 
and four counts of differing degrees of theft in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990). They also convicted Seel of 
possession of a firearm by a restricted person, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2) (Supp. 
1991). This appeal followed. 
On appeal, defendants claim that they were denied their 
right to effective counsel, that the trial court incorrectly 
construed the possession requirement of the aggravated burglary 
statute, that the trial court committed plain error by failing to 
sever the potentially prejudicial charge of possession of a 
firearm, and that defendants were denied a fair trial by the 
prosecutor's misconduct in closing argument and by the court's 
admitting into evidence the tools found in the Scout. Seel also 
claims that the court's dismissal and subsequent reinstatement of 
the charge of possession of a firearm violated his right against 
double jeopardy. We consider each contention in turn. 
I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Defendants contend that they were denied their right to 
effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and by Article I, Section 12 
of the Utah Constitution. Because an after-the-fact analysis of 
counsel conduct can have a distorting effect, "the burden of 
establishing inadequate representation is on the defendant *and 
proof of such must be a demonstrable reality and not a 
speculative matter./M Codianna v. Morris. 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 
(Utah 1983) (quoting State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 
910549-CA 
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prove Count V [possession of a firearm by a restricted person] 
obviously would have a prejudicial effect on the jury's attitude 
concerning the defendant[s'] guilt or innocence on the other 
counts within the Information." This mere allegation is 
insufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, considering 
the overwhelming evidence of guilt on the theft and burglary 
charges: defendants' Scout was seen leaving the area of the 
burglaries; defendants were stopped minutes later with the stolen 
merchandise in their vehicle; their vehicle also contained tools 
consistent with the pry marks at the burglary scene; their story 
regarding another possible explanation proved to be incredible. 
Since the evidence of defendants' guilt was overwhelming, the 
balance was tipped even without the prior convictions evidence. 
As in Hallett, any failure of counsel regarding severance was not 
prejudicial. Xd. at 707.2 
B. Counsel's Failure to Seek Timely Exclusion of Witnesses 
Defendants also fail to show prejudice in their claim that 
counsel neglected to seek timely exclusion of witnesses. In a 
case involving violation of a witness exclusion order, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
[T]he onus of showing wherein he has been 
prejudiced by a ruling of the lower court 
falls upon the defendant. Defendant in the 
instant case merely alleges prejudice without 
pointing to inconsistencies in the record or 
other evidence which would show wherein he 
has been prejudiced. 
State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981) (footnote omitted). 
In another witness exclusion case, the court refused to grant a 
mistrial for violation because ff[t]here was no evidence or 
suggestion that any witness changed his testimony because of the 
conversations." State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631, 634 (Utah 1988). 
This requirement that defendants demonstrate, rather than merely 
allege, prejudice when a trial court refuses to declare a 
mistrial for violation of an exclusion order has even stronger 
application to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, when 
2. Defendants further argue that in light of counsel's failure 
to make a motion, the court committed plain error in not severing 
sua sponte the charge of possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person. Because counsel failed to raise the issue, defendants 
must demonstrate that the court's action was plain error: both 
obvious ("plain") and harmful. State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 
29 (Utah 1990). For the same reasons that counsel's failure to 
request severance was not prejudicial, the court's failure to 
sever the firearm possession count was not harmful. 
910549-CA 
5 
defendants had committed the burglaries: he had seen defendants' 
orange and white Scout with Colorado license plates, the only 
vehicle in the area, speeding away from the burglary scenes 
immediately after the alarm sounded. Deputy Mangum, seeing the 
same Scout with Colorado license plates, relied on these 
articulable facts which the officer had radioed to him, and made 
a stop which was no more intrusive than the stop the original 
officer could have made. 
Deputy Mangum also had probable cause for the arrest. ffxThe 
determination should be made on an objective standard: whether 
from the facts known to the officer, and the inferences which 
fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person 
in his position would be justified in believing that the suspect 
had committed the offense.'" State v. Cole. 674 P.2d 119, 125 
(Utah 1983) (quoting State v. Hatcher. 27 Utah 2d 318, 495 P.2d 
1259, 1260 (1972)). Deputy Mangum's arrest was based on the 
transmitted information describing the vehicle, his observation 
of the merchandise in the car, and his discussion with the 
officer who had investigated the burglaries. 
Additionally, since Seel consented to the vehicle search and 
officers obtained a search warrant, defendants' argument that the 
search was warrantless is without factual basis. We decline to 
consider any other allegations, such as defendants' claim that 
the officer used a flashlight, for which defendants have provided 
no record support. See Montes. 804 P.2d at 546. Hence, 
defendants have mentioned no basis for filing a motion to 
suppress that would support granting that motion. 
E. Trial Court's Denial of Effective Assistance 
Defendants next claim that actions of the trial court denied 
them effective assistance of counsel. Defendants' contention 
that the trial court denied them effective assistance of counsel 
by allowing original counsel to withdraw is without basis. The 
record shows that all precautions of Rule 4-604 of the Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration,3 governing withdrawal of counsel, 
3. Subsection (1), which provides for withdrawal of counsel 
prior to entry of judgment in criminal cases, states: 
(A) Consistent with the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, an attorney may 
withdraw as counsel of record in criminal 
cases except where withdrawal may result in a 
delay of the trial or prejudice to the 
client. In those cases, an attorney may not 




objection or some form of specific preservation of claims of 
error must be made a part of the trial court record before an 
appellate court will review such claim on appeal.'" State v. 
Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (emphasis in original) 
(quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987)). We 
believe that defendants' assertion at trial that the evidence did 
not "establish[] possession within the intent of the statute" was 
specific enough to preserve this argument for appeal. 
"When examining a trial court's interpretation of a 
statutory provision we apply a correction of error standard. 
. . . [A] penal statute shall be construed *according to the fair 
import of [its] terms to promote justice.'" State v. Swapp, 808 
P.2d 115, 120 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-106 (1990)), cert, denied. 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony when 
in attempting, committing, or fleeing from a 
buralarv the actor or another participant in 
the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to 
any person who is not a participant 
in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the 
immediate use of a dangerous weapon 
against any person who is not a 
participant in the crime; or 
(c) possesses or attempts to 
use any explosive or dangerous 
weapon• 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1990) (emphasis added). Defendants 
cite State ex rel. J.L.S., 610 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1980), arguing 
that the term "possesses" must be of equal gravity to "uses or 
threatens" or "attempts to use" a dangerous weapon. However, 
State ex rel. J.L.S., which construed an ambiguous statute to 
survive a void for vagueness challenge, is inapposite, since 
"possesses" is not an ambiguous term in this statute. "Possess" 
is defined by statute: "to have physical possession of or to 
exercise dominion or control over tangible property." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-601(9) (1990) (emphasis added). 
The purpose of the aggravated burglary statute is to promote 
the safety of peace officers and citizens by discouraging violent 
behavior in the commission of an otherwise nonviolent crime. If 
defendants exercised "dominion or control" over the weapon to the 
extent that injury to a person "not a participant in the crime" 
could reasonably have resulted, this is sufficient to satisfy the 
statutory definition of possession. Specifically, in the present 
case the question becomes whether the weapon could reasonably 
have been used against officers while defendants were fleeing. 
910549-CA 
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present casef defendants were still present and the proceeding 
did not adjourn. McClelland, 604 P.2d at 971. Based on this 
precedent, the trial court's decision to allow the State to 
reopen the evidence was not plain error. 
IV. OTHER CLAIMS 
Defendants also argue that the prosecutor's misconduct in 
his closing remarks deprived defendants of a fair trial. 
However, defendants' failure to object to the prosecutor's 
comments or to ask for a curative jury instruction at trial 
waived defendants' right to appeal this issue. State v. 
Humphrey. 793 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah App. 1990). Finally, 
defendants argue that the court erred in admitting into evidence 
the tools found in the vehicle. We have considered this claim 
and found it without merit. State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886, 888-
89 (Utah 1989). 
On all issues, we affirm the trial court's order convicting 
defendants. 
<&?&&^^ty 
Norman H. Jackson, 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Leohard H. Russon, Judge 
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